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This Article presents two new arguments against “discounting” 
future human lives during cost-benefit analysis, arguing that even 
absent ethical objections to the disparate treatment of present and 
future humanity, the economic calculations of cost-benefit analysis 
itself—if properly performed—counsel against discounting lives at 
anything close to current rates.  In other words, even if society sets 
aside all concerns with the discounting of future generations in 
principle, current discounting of future human lives cannot be 
justified even on the discounters’ own terms.  First, because cost-
benefit analysis has thus far ignored evidence of rising health care 
expenditures, it underestimates the “willingness to pay” for health and 
safety that future citizens will likely exhibit, thereby undervaluing 
their lives.  Second, cost-benefit analysis ignores the trend of 
improved material conditions in developed countries.  As time 
advances, residents of rich countries tend to live better and spend 
more, meaning that a strict economic monetization of future persons 
values the lives of our expected descendents above those of present 
citizens.  These two factors justify “inflation” of future lives that 
would offset, perhaps completely, the discount rate used for human 
life.  Until regulators correct their method of discounting the benefits 
of saving human lives in the future, the United States will continue to 
suffer the fatal costs of underregulation, and agencies will remain in 
violation of legal requirements to maximize net benefits. 
INTRODUCTION 
nderregulation kills.  When a sensible and effective regulation is 
proposed but then not implemented, society loses whatever 
benefits the regulation would have provided.  When those benefits 
take the form of saved lives—if, for example, the regulation would 
have kept a certain carcinogen out of the workplace—failing to enact 
and enforce a regulation means people die.  For at least two reasons, 
U
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federal agencies in the United States systematically undercount the 
benefits of regulation, causing regulators to forsake the 
implementation of lifesaving laws that would have been enacted were 
benefits estimated more accurately.  The result is countless American 
lives lost every year.1 
This Article presents two new arguments against the “discounting” 
of future human lives as part of cost-benefit analysis (CBA), arguing 
that even absent ethical objections to the disparate treatment of 
present and future humanity, the economic calculations of cost-
benefit analysis itself—if properly performed—counsel against 
discounting lives.  In other words, even if society sets aside all 
concerns with the discounting of future generations in principle, the 
current practice of discounting future human lives cannot be justified 
even on the discounters’ own terms.  First, because cost-benefit 
analysis has thus far ignored evidence of rising health care 
expenditures, it underestimates the “willingness to pay” for health and 
safety that future citizens will likely exhibit, thereby undervaluing 
their lives.  Second, cost-benefit analysis ignores the trend of 
improved material conditions in developed countries.  As time 
advances, residents of rich countries tend to live better and spend 
more, meaning that a strict economic evaluation of future lives would 
discount the relatively impoverished lives of present citizens 
compared to the projected luxurious and healthy existence of our 
expected descendents. 
Because all federal regulatory agencies calculate costs and benefits, 
the underregulation resulting from overdiscounting deprives 
Americans of benefits in several diverse ways.  By undercounting the 
benefits of environmental protection, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) deprives Americans of clean air and clean water.  By 
undercounting the benefits of workplace safety, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) exposes Americans to 
health hazards.  By undercounting the benefits of automobile accident 
prevention, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
increases the number of fatal crashes.  Examples are limited only by 
the number of federal agencies and the scope of their regulatory 
mandate, meaning there is effectively no limit.  Regulations 
concerning global climate change, the benefits of which would be 
realized far into the future, are especially impeded by 
 
1 I use the word “countless” advisedly; the number of needless deaths literally cannot be 
counted with any reliability. 
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overdiscounting.  Until regulators correct their method for 
discounting the benefits of saving human lives in the future, the 
United States will continue to suffer the fatal costs of underregulation, 
and agencies will remain in violation of legal requirements to 
maximize net benefits. 
I 
HOW PRESENT LIVES ARE VALUED, AND THE PROBLEM OF 
DISCOUNTING 
When deciding whether and how to regulate, federal agencies 
evaluate the costs and benefits of proposed regulatory strategies, 
comparing one strategy against another and against doing nothing.2  
Because the purpose of regulation is often to save lives—or at least to 
reduce risks to life—the benefits of many potential policies cannot be 
quantified without setting a value on human life.  For example, 
imagine a potential Department of Transportation (DOT) regulation 
providing that any city receiving federal highway construction funds 
must employ a specified number of school crossing guards to prevent 
students from being struck by cars.3  The costs of the regulations, 
while uncertain, could be estimated with some pretense of accuracy.  
How many crossing guards do recipient cities employ today?  How 
much would each additional guard’s salary, fringe benefits, and 
overhead cost?  Although some estimation will be necessary, a 
plausible number can be offered.  For this exercise, assume extra 
crossing guards cost a total of $100 million yearly.  The benefits of 
extra guards, however, defy straightforward quantification.  Even if 
the sole benefit is the prevention of fatal car accidents,4 the magnitude 
 
2 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 
601 (requiring that agencies conduct cost-benefit analysis before promulgating major 
regulation).  See generally Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2002). 
3 Although I have not found such a crossing-guard mandate, DOT regulations 
concerning local school crossing guards do exist.  See, e.g., National Standards for Traffic 
Control Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 268, 273 (Jan. 2, 2008) (discussing Federal Highway 
Administration standards for “STOP paddles used by adult crossing guards”); 
Amendments to Highway Safety Program Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 14,843, 14,857 (Apr. 
1, 2009) (“Local school officials and law enforcement personnel should work together to 
establish crossing guard programs.”); see also 32 C.F.R. § 634.24(b)(3) (2009) (directing 
Army “installation commanders” to develop traffic circulation plans that should “includ[e] 
trained school-crossing guards”). 
4 One would expect additional benefits; the crossing guards may prevent non-fatal 
accidents, reduce street crime, provide lost motorists with directions, and perform other 
useful services. 
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of the benefit remains unknowable—or at least not capable of being 
weighed against the $100 million cost—unless the policy maker 
ascribes a monetary value to each life saved.  If the extra guards 
would save twenty lives annually, then the value of the benefits 
exceeds the value of the costs only if each life saved is valued above 
$5 million. 
Is it worth $5 million dollars to save a schoolchild from being 
killed by a speeding car?  At some level, the question is preposterous, 
unanswerable.  But both cost-benefit analysis and the laws requiring 
that it be performed demand a number.  To calculate the value of a 
human life—sometimes called the “value of a statistical life” 
(VSL)—economists have attempted to determine how persons value 
the elimination of risks of death.  For example, if a person would pay 
x dollars to avoid a one-in-a-hundred chance of instant death, then the 
person values his own life at 100-times-x dollars.  To determine a 
person’s “willingness to pay” (WTP) to avoid risk, one can simply 
ask (i.e., collect survey data), or one can extrapolate willingness to 
pay based on real-world phenomena, such as wage premiums for 
dangerous jobs.5  If two jobs are otherwise identical but one presents 
a one-in-a-thousand risk of death each year for every worker, then 
employees at the dangerous job should demand higher compensation.6  
An annual wage premium of $8000 would imply that workers are 
willing to accept the risk in exchange for that amount (or that workers 
at the safe job are willing to pay $8000 to avoid the risk),7 leading to 
a statistical life valued at $8 million.8 
 
5 See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the 
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 955–57 (1999). 
6 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
1912 (1993).  The workers “should” demand higher compensation in a world wherein 
certain assumptions of economists, such as workers possessing accurate information about 
wages and risks at their own and other workplaces, are true.  The validity of such 
assumptions is a question beyond the scope of this work. 
7 For purposes of this Article, the difference between calculations relying on 
“willingness to pay” (WTP) and “willingness to accept” (WTA) is not especially 
important.  The key is that, one way or another, economists can determine a VSL based on 
wage premiums and other market phenomena.  For more detail on the distinction between 
WTP and WTA, as well as the potential relevance of so-called “endowment effects” in 
deciding which is more useful, see Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, How the New 
Economics Can Improve Employment Discrimination Law, and How Economics Can 
Survive the Demise of the “Rational Actor,” 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 183, 206–10 
(2009); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L.J. 
385, 400 (2004). 
8 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION (1993); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Value of Life, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 209 
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In addition to calculating the values of costs and benefits, 
regulators must consider when costs will be borne and when benefits 
will be enjoyed.  A benefit reaped today is normally worth more than 
the same benefit tomorrow, and a cost incurred today normally hurts 
more than the prospect of an identical future cost.9  This concept 
explains why banks charge interest and why J. Wellington Wimpy so 
often told Popeye, “I will gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger 
today.”10  Because many regulations impose up-front costs to achieve 
future benefits,11 a cost-benefit analysis incorporates the “present 
value” of future costs and benefits.12  So far, so good.  Few would 
dispute that a hamburger today is worth more than the promise of a 
future hamburger, even if one is absolutely certain that the future 
hamburger will be delivered as promised.  Why is a hamburger today 
better than a guaranteed future hamburger?  The theory is that one 
could sell the hamburger today, invest the proceeds, and then buy the 
future hamburger later.  If the investment beats inflation, one can 
enjoy the future hamburger and extra cash.  In practice, an investment 
in U.S. Treasury bonds would likely provide at least some extra cash 
at close to zero risk.  Another reason hamburgers today are worth 
more than guaranteed future hamburgers is that someone entitled to a 
hamburger today has additional options.  For example, if she is at the 
brink of starvation, the hamburger today (or its cash value) could save 
her life, and the promised hamburger will be worth nothing if she dies 
before its delivery.  Unless there exists a market for selling the rights 
to future hamburgers, one entitled to a promised burger has a highly 
illiquid asset.  For all these reasons, regulators sensibly discount the 
value of most future benefits. 
 
(1990).  Other data one might use to calculate VSLs include wrongful death verdicts, life 
insurance purchases, and payments by the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund. 
9 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 598 (5th ed. 2008); RICHARD 
A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 14 (7th ed. 
2003) (“[A] dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow, because the dollar today 
can be invested to start earning interest immediately.”). 
10 See ELZIE CRISLER SEGAR, THIMBLE THEATER, INTRODUCING POPEYE: A 
COMPLETE COMPILATION OF THE FIRST ADVENTURES OF POPEYE, 1928–1930 (1977). 
11 A simple example: When the Environmental Protection Agency mandated the 
reduction of lead in automotive fuel, industry incurred up-front costs, and the benefits (a 
reduction in lead poisoning) came later.  See OFFICE OF POL’Y ANALYSIS, U.S. EPA, 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING LEAD IN GASOLINE: FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS I-23 (1985) (“[W]e use a 10 percent real discount rate to compute present 
values . . . .  Generally, the higher the discount rate, the lower the net benefits, because 
costs usually are incurred sooner than benefits.”). 
12 See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 1559–60. 
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Controversy results from the combination of these two practices—
the valuation of statistical lives and the discounting of future benefits.  
The problem is that while a hamburger available today is worth more 
than a hamburger provided in the future, it is far less clear that a life 
saved today is more valuable than a life saved a few years from now.  
If one regulation can deliver x dollars immediately and another 
regulation costing the same amount would take ten years to deliver 
the same dollar amount, then the first regulation wins any cost-benefit 
contest.13  But if one regulation saves a schoolchild today, and 
another regulation costing the same amount would save a schoolchild 
ten years from now,14 which regulation should be enacted? 
A.  The Status Quo 
The consensus among policy makers is that the life saved today is 
indeed worth more than the one saved in the future, and cost-benefit 
analyses generally discount future VSLs just as they discount future 
economic benefits.15  In a recent rule-making proposal, the Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA) announced a plan to restrict mobile 
telephone use by train operators.16  To justify the proposed rule, the 
FRA produced a CBA as part of its regulatory impact analysis.17  
 
13 Note that if the delay is sufficiently long (say, a generation or two), discounting 
becomes problematic even without monetization of human lives.  One who spends 
recklessly now will suffer the consequences in her own future, but persons spending 
recklessly the patrimony of future generations suffer no such reckoning.  See sources cited 
infra note 42; see also Coleman Bazelon & Kent Smetters, Discounting in the Long Term, 
35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 277, 281 (2001); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 251–58 (rev. 
ed. 1999). 
14 The dichotomy contemplates two different children potentially saved, each the same 
age at the time saved.  For the same person, a risk (or certainty) of death now is worse than 
that same risk (or certainty) ten years from now.  Humans being mortal, efforts to avoid 
fatalities (such as driving carefully or seeking medical attention for injuries) reflect a 
desire to postpone—not to prevent—bearing the ultimate “cost” faced by us all. 
15 See generally Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting . . . on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 
(2007) (objecting to current practice); Dexter Samida & David A. Weisbach, Paretian 
Intergenerational Discounting, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 145, 145 (2007) (arguing that 
“discounting future costs and benefits of projects [including lives] does not undervalue 
future generations”). 
16 See Restrictions on Railroad Operating Employees’ Use of Cellular Telephones and 
Other Electronic Devices, 75 Fed. Reg. 27,672, 27,673 (May 18, 2010) (to be codified at 
49 C.F.R. pt. 220) (proposing a rule that would replace an emergency temporary rule 
currently in force). 
17 Id. at 27,683.  Because the regulation at issue is so straightforward and the benefits so 
clear, this document offers a good starting point for readers relatively unfamiliar with 
CBAs and the process of creating them. 
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Costs included training railroad employees, as well as the 
“opportunity costs” of additional time spent in safety briefings, which 
employees could otherwise spend somewhere else.18  The FRA then 
considered what benefits would be necessary to justify the costs.  In 
the agency’s words, “FRA compared the costs of the proposed rule to 
the minimum number of statistical fatalities that would need to be 
prevented for the rule to be cost-beneficial.”19  With the costs 
measured in dollars, such a comparison was possible only if the FRA 
assigned a monetary value to the prevention of “statistical fatalities.”  
Concluding that “the regulation would yield positive net benefits if it 
prevented the loss of just half of the value of a statistical life each 
year over the twenty-year period examined,”20 which the agency 
considered quite likely,21 the FRA proposed that the regulation be 
enacted.  Perhaps because the benefits of preventing train operators 
from chatting on mobile phones so obviously outweigh the costs of 
the regulation, no explicit discussion of discounting saved lives 
appears in the FRA’s notice of proposed rulemaking.  Regardless, 
discounting is silently included in the agency’s assessment of “the 
value of a statistical life [saved] each year” for twenty years. 
Explicit discounting of future saved lives appears in a proposed 
rule concerning food labeling announced by the Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (FSIS) of the Department of Agriculture.  The rule 
requires labels disclosing the percentage of fat in certain meat 
products, including ground hamburger meat, where such labeling was 
previously voluntary.22  The rule would cost meat producers and 
retailers hundreds of millions of dollars.23  The benefits would appear 
in the form of improved health enjoyed by meat consumers caused by 
 
18 Id.  The FRA’s conclusion about costs was that “[a]pplying highly conservative 
assumptions, 20-year direct and indirect costs could total as much as $22.4 million 
(discounted at 7%) or $30.2 million (discounted at 3%).”  Id. at 27,674. 
19 Id. at 27,684. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. (“For some perspective on the achievability of such prevention, FRA notes that 
over the period from 2000 to 2008, electronic device usage in trains likely caused or 
contributed to accidents resulting in at least 30 fatalities and over 100 injuries—an average 
of over three deaths per year, as well as significant train delay and property damages.”). 
22 Nutrition Labeling of Single-Ingredient Products and Ground or Chopped Meat and 
Poultry Products, 74 Fed. Reg. 67,736, 67,739 (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Nutrition 
Labeling Rule] (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 317, 381). 
23 Depending on the discount rate, FSIS estimated the present value of the costs 
between $348 million and $472 million.  Id. at 67,773. 
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greater access to nutritional information.24  FSIS estimated that after 
the labeling rules have been in force for several years, the regulation 
will save about 114.5 lives annually.25  Accordingly, like so many 
regulations, the meat-labeling rule would have up-front costs and 
distant benefits, making the discount rate an important factor in the 
FSIS cost-benefit analysis.  The higher the discount rate, the lower the 
present value of the benefits, and the less likely the regulation will be 
enacted.  The value of a statistical life chosen by the agency will also 
significantly affect the result, with a higher VSL leading to higher 
benefit numbers.  Here, FSIS calculated a range of expected benefits, 
using VSLs from $5 million to $6.5 million and discount rates of 3% 
and 7%.26  The vastly different outcomes starkly illustrate the 
importance of the discount rate and VSL chosen by the agency.27  
With a VSL of $6.5 million and a discount rate of 3%, the total 
benefits are estimated to equal $5.9 billion.  With a VSL of $5 million 
and a discount rate of 7%, the total benefits are estimated to equal 
$1.1 billion.28  In other words, with no changes in assumptions 
concerning the effectiveness of food labeling in changing 
consumption habits, the relationship between meat consumption and 
fatal diseases, or the likelihood that industry will obey new 
regulations, the estimated benefits can nonetheless increase more than 
fivefold (or, from the other perspective, decrease by more than 80%) 
depending on procedural choices made by an agency during the CBA 
process.29 
 
24 Id. at 67,782 (“The benefits of this supplemental proposed rule would be the lives 
saved due to the estimated reductions in mortality rates associated with coronary heart 
disease and selected cancers.”). 
25 Id. at 67,783 (“Decreases in intake of saturated fat, fat, and cholesterol will reduce 
the incidence of heart disease and cancer, but not immediately—the reductions in illness 
and death will begin to occur years into the future.”). 
26 Id. at 67,783–84. 
27 See Bazelon & Smetters, supra note 13, at 278; Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit 
Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1711–12 (2001) (noting “erratic” fluctuation 
in discount rates used by federal agencies, with even the same agency adopting different 
rates for different future costs and benefits “for no apparent reason”). 
28 Nutrition Labeling Rule, supra note 22, at 67,783–84. 
29 References in CBA to ranges of VSLs and discount rates are quite common.  See, 
e.g., Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, Storage, and 
Transportation, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,030, 33,055 (July 9, 2009) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 
16, 118) (FDA: “The values in this column will vary depending upon the particular 
estimates of the value of a statistical life (VSL) . . . and the discount rate.”); Aircraft 
Repair Station Security, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,874, 59,884 (Nov. 18, 2009) (to be codified at 49 
C.F.R. pts. 1520, 1554) (TSA); Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle 
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The FSIS regulatory impact analysis also illustrates another reason 
that discounting of human lives plays such an important role when 
regulations are under review.  Even though FSIS believed that its 
proposed meat-labeling rule would have benefits in addition to saving 
human lives, those benefits were ignored when the agency quantified 
the rule’s estimated monetary benefits.30  As a result, for purposes of 
the CBA, the value of preventing a nonfatal cancer was zero.31  
Similarly, in the regulatory impact analysis justifying a recent OSHA 
regulation aimed at preventing crane accidents, “the Agency did not 
estimate cost savings from avoiding crane accidents, but only 
estimated monetized benefits for avoiding fatalities . . . or injuries.”32  
Scholars have long criticized the tendency of agencies to ignore 
entirely benefits they cannot easily quantify,33 a problem particularly 
acute when regulations have mostly noneconomic benefits such as the 
protection of an endangered species with no obvious monetary value 
 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 
Fed. Reg. 49,454, 49,460 (Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 86, 600) (EPA). 
30 Nutrition Labeling Rule, supra note 22, at 67,782 (“Given questions concerning data 
quality and unsettled methodological issues in estimating the benefits of a reduction in 
non-fatal cases of coronary heart disease, FSIS is restricting its analysis of benefits to 
reductions in premature death.”). 
31 The common practice of disregarding important (but difficult to calculate) benefits is 
behind the decision to ignore all benefits other than prevention of fatal accidents in the 
crossing guard example above.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also 
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 
173 (1999) (“Although EPA estimated the benefits from reducing lead damage to 
plumbing components, it did not include this estimate in the CBA published with the final 
rule [concerning lead in drinking water].”); James K. Hammitt, Stratospheric-Ozone 
Depletion, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 131, 149 
(Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997) (reporting the EPA’s ignoring, in CBA for regulation 
protecting stratospheric ozone, benefits of preventing certain skin cancers). 
32 Cranes and Derricks in Construction, 75 Fed. Reg. 47,906, 48,095 (Aug. 9, 2010) (to 
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1926) (“These cost savings do not represent other losses 
associated with accidents, such as production time lost to provide medical services to 
injured employees, damage to cranes, damage to the work site or beyond, damage to the 
load materials or rigging, lost time in cleaning up and repairing damage to the worksite, 
lost production time while the crane is removed, repaired, or replaced with a substitute.”). 
33 E.g., William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law—
Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 182 (2009) (arguing that 
the cost-benefit analysis process has elevated monetary costs over often intangible 
benefits); see also David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 335, 398–99 (2006); Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 
7, 58 (1998) (“neglecting ‘soft’ considerations like fairness, dignity, and intrinsic beauty 
does bias the analysis against regulatory intervention”). 
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or the preservation of unspoiled wilderness.34  Pervasive dismissal of 
unquantifiable benefits may be explained by the tendency of courts to 
deem arbitrary and capricious—and accordingly to strike down—
regulations justified by benefits with no numeric value.35  Agencies 
have limited time to devote to regulation, and if appellate judges have 
no respect for unquantifiable benefits, agencies are wise to focus on 
what works, irrespective of whether such judicial policy making is 
appropriate.36  Whatever the reason for the outsized attention given to 
benefits with dollar values, and in particular to lives saved, any 
change in the procedure for assigning monetary values to human lives 
has tremendous potential to affect the day-to-day ability of agencies 
to respond to problems. 
B.  Ethical Problems with the Status Quo 
In addition to practical concerns, to which this Article devotes most 
of its attention, critics such as Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling 
have attacked the discounting of future lives during CBA calculations 
as unethical.37  The simplest argument against discounting future 
lives is that one should not value present persons above future 
persons.  As evidence for this moral claim, critics note that with a 
positive discount rate, even enormous future benefits have minimal 
present value.  Imagine, for example, that scientists announce that one 
thousand years from today, an asteroid will destroy the Earth, killing 
everyone on it.  Fear not, however.  For $100, NASA can build an 
 
34 See Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory 
Movement, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 648, 655 (2002); see generally Amy Sinden, The 
Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less Is More in the Economic Analysis of Critical 
Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129 (2004). 
35 See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (vacating 
EPA rule promulgated under the Toxic Substances Control Act that would have banned 
most uses of asbestos); see also Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of 
Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 541–49 (1997).  
“The judges [in Corrosion Proof Fittings], in short, lacked the breadth and depth of 
experience and expertise necessary to support such confident assertions about how the 
agency should go about its assigned business.  And they almost certainly got it wrong.”  
Id. at 547. 
36 The decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings was particularly demoralizing to EPA staff.  
See Jennifer L. Leonardi, It’s Still Here! The Continuing Battle over Asbestos in America, 
16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 137–38 (2005) (recounting EPA staffers lamenting that asbestos 
is “killing people and that the court ruling was not going to make that fact disappear”).  
The Department of Justice declined to appeal the Firth Circuit decision.  Id. at 138. 
37 See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE 
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 179–203 (2004). 
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asteroid deflector, launch it into space, and redirect the giant rock 
elsewhere, saving all humanity.  The deflector must be launched 
immediately for the procedure to work.38  Let us consider the costs 
and benefits of the project. 
Costs: $100.  Benefits: About nine billion human lives saved in one 
thousand years.   
Do the benefits outweigh the costs?  The economists say no.  With 
a world population of nine billion persons, each of whom is worth $7 
million,39 the total benefits equal $6.3 x 1016.  But these future 
benefits must be discounted.  With a discount rate of 3.5% per year,40 
the standard formula of 
Present Value = Future Benefit / ( 1 + Discount Rate )Years 
reveals that the value of saving nine billion lives in one thousand 
years equals 
( $6.3 • 1016 ) / 1.0351000 = $72.28 
Seventy-two dollars, twenty-eight cents.  If NASA devoted $100 to 
this effort, it would waste nearly $28.  A discount rate of 4% yields a 
 
38 Although this scenario may strain credulity, societies often face the choice of acting 
quickly or never.  The passenger pigeon, once one of the most abundant birds in the world, 
disappeared forever when the last bird died in the Cincinnati Zoo in 1914.  See David 
Wilcove, In Memory of Martha and Her Kind, 91 AUDUBON, Sept. 1989, at 52.  
Americans cannot correct the regulatory failure that allowed the extinction of the species.  
In addition, some chemicals (such as dense nonaqueous phase liquids) have proven 
impossible to fully remove from contaminated groundwater.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF SOLID 
WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSES, U.S. EPA, RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EPA 
GROUND WATER TASK FORCE 23–25 (2007) (discussing sites where cleanup would be 
wasteful or impossible because of “technical impracticability”); THE DNAPL 
REMEDIATION CHALLENGE: IS THERE A CASE FOR SOURCE DEPLETION?, EPA/600/R-
03/143, at xiii (2003) (acknowledging that full remediation of certain sites is “unlikely”). 
39 These numbers are conservative; they likely overestimate the future monetary 
benefits.  See U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, World Population to 2300 1, U.N. Doc. 
ST/ESA/SER.A/236 (2004) (projecting a population around nine billion); Seth Borenstein, 
An American Life Worth Less Today, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 10, 2008, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-07-10-796349025_x.htm (reporting that in 
May 2008, EPA calculated a VSL of $6.9 million); Nutrition Labeling Rule, supra note 
22, at 67,783 (discussing VSL of $5 million and noting that other agencies, such as the 
Food and Drug Administration, use that figure). 
40 This is another conservative number.  Federal agencies often use much higher 
discount rates, and higher discount rates yield smaller present values.  E.g., Nutrition 
Labeling Rule, supra note 22, at 67,773 (stating that the agency prepared estimates using 
discount rates of 3% and 7%); see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 31, 34 (2003) (“For regulatory analysis, you should provide 
estimates of net benefits using both 3 percent and 7 percent.”); Revesz, supra note 5, at 
977–78; see also supra note 11 (showing EPA’s use of a 10% discount rate). 
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total value of less than one dollar,41 and discount rates of 5% or 
higher yield totals well below one cent.  Little training in moral 
philosophy is required to recognize that the economists have offered a 
monstrous definition of “value.”  It is difficult to imagine a 
constructive dialogue concerning the proper use of tax dollars in 
which one participant truly deems it wasteful to devote a penny (or 
$100, for that matter) to saving the planet and all its inhabitants in the 
distant future. 
These arguments are not new,42 and the proponents of discounting 
future lives have various answers for them.43  For now, I would like 
to put aside the attacks on discounting future lives, at least those 
attacks which challenge the foundation of CBA generally.  It will 
suffice to state that while the issue remains hotly debated, the moral 
and ethical arguments appear to have little chance of changing the 
actual calculations of costs and benefits conducted by federal 
agencies.44  When considering this Article’s subsequent discussion of 
how discount rates should properly be calculated in a regulatory 
environment that insists on using them, it will be useful to recall that 
if the ethical criticisms reviewed in this Part are justified, any practice 
that tends to inflate the CBA discount rate is especially pernicious, for 
it exacerbates the effects of an already lethal, immoral procedure. 
 
41 Fifty-eight cents. 
42 See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 357 (1984); Revesz, supra note 5, at 
947 n.21 (and sources cited therein); see also Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the 
Social Discount Rate, in JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 144, 145 
(Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds., 1992) (“Imagine finding out that you, having just 
reached your twenty-first birthday, must soon die of cancer because one evening Cleopatra 
wanted an extra helping of dessert.”). 
43 E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Your Money or Your Life, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 15, 2004, 
http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/your-money-or-your-life (reviewing 
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 37, and concluding that “we cannot rely entirely 
on cost-benefit analysis, but we will do a lot better, morally as well as practically, with it 
than without it”); see also Kysar, supra note 15, at 131 (collecting defenses of discounting 
future lives). 
44 Indeed, although Heinzerling has been appointed Senior Policy Counsel on climate 
change for the EPA, agency regulations must go through the Office of Management and 
Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which is currently run by 
Sunstein. 
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II 
WHY CBA DEFENDERS ARE WRONG ON THE NUMBERS EVEN IF 
THEY ARE RIGHT ON THE ETHICS 
Even if CBA, the monetization of human life, and the discounting 
of future benefits are all taken as givens—if all moral objections are 
tabled—the current practice of discounting future human life cannot 
be justified even on a purely economic basis.  Within the current CBA 
discounting regime, the discount rate for future lives should be 
radically reduced for two reasons.  First, the inflation of health care 
costs, which are increasing far faster than the price of other goods and 
services, indicates that future generations will exhibit far greater 
“willingness to pay” to avoid fatal risks than economists measure 
today, meaning that the value of future lives—which is discounted to 
find a present value—is currently underestimated by CBA 
practitioners.  Second, modern industrialized societies tend to increase 
in wealth, meaning that even if health care does not increase as a 
portion of the U.S. gross domestic product, future generations of 
Americans will be richer than Americans are today, meaning they will 
have more money to spend avoiding risk.  These factors combine to 
cause a massive undervaluation of future human lives, thereby 
causing the underestimation of the benefits of environmental and 
other regulation, which accordingly—even if the CBA proponents are 
granted their primary premises—leads to needless deaths.45 
A.  Health Care Costs Inflate Faster than Costs of Normal Goods 
In recent years, rapid health care cost inflation has captured the 
attention of American politicians and scholars.46  CBA calculations, 
however, have not considered health inflation when calculating the 
value of future lives.  Ignoring health inflation undervalues future 
 
45 Inaccurate CBA calculations also prevent agencies from obeying executive orders 
and statutes requiring that they maximize the “net benefits” of regulations.  See infra Part 
IV.B.3. 
46 See President Barack Obama, Remarks to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care 
(Sept. 9, 2009) (“If we do nothing to slow these skyrocketing costs, we will eventually be 
spending more on Medicare and Medicaid than every other government program 
combined.”); Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative Democracy in Health 
Care, 97 GEO. L.J. 1, 9–10 (2008) (“After a pause in the mid-1990s, the sharp upward 
spiral in costs has resumed.”).  Hereinafter, I will use “health inflation” as shorthand for 
the increase of health care costs at rates higher than the rate of inflation measured for other 
goods and services. 
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lives no matter what discount rate is applied to future benefits.  
Accordingly, regardless of whether agencies should use 3%, 7%, 
10%, or some other number—or even if they should use no discount 
rate at all, that is, a rate of 0%—underestimating the future value of a 
life saved will cause a CBA calculation to lowball the present value of 
that future benefit.47 
From 1960 to 2006, health care costs tripled as a portion of the 
U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), rising from consuming 5.2% to 
consuming 16% of GDP.48  Since 1980, health inflation has outpaced 
general inflation on average by more than 3% annually.49  With 
Americans devoting a greater percentage of their income to health 
care, it would appear that their “willingness to pay” to avoid death is 
rising.  In other words, even in inflation-adjusted dollars, a future 
American will likely exhibit a willingness to pay more money to 
preserve his health (by, for example, avoiding a risk of death caused 
by exposure to workplace contaminants) than Americans do today.  
Assuming for the moment that health inflation will continue to 
outpace general inflation by 3% annually over the coming decade, 
then someone’s willingness to pay in 2021 can be calculated as 
follows: 
WTP2021 = WTP2011 • 1.0310 
  = WTP2011 • 1.34 
Accounting for health inflation increases the value of a 2021 life by 
more than a third.  Substituting a twenty-year time period increases 
the value of a 2031 life by 81%.  The resulting future value could then 
be discounted to determine its present value.  Note, however, that the 
closer the discount rate is to the excess health inflation rate, the closer 
the “real discount rate” for future lives comes to zero.  For example, if 
 
47 See supra note 40 (collecting various discount rates). 
48 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2008 WITH 
SPECIAL FEATURE ON THE HEALTH OF YOUNG ADULTS 412 tbl.124 (2008), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus08.pdf. 
49 KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER 
HEALTH BENEFITS: 2007 ANNUAL SURVEY 18–19 (2007), available at http://www.kff 
.org/insurance/7672/upload/76723.pdf.  While some of the increased health care costs are 
attributable to waste—in the form of insurance company profits, medical billing overhead, 
and the like—much of the rising costs reflect improved care.  Drugs and devices, among 
other forms of health care, have improved tremendously in recent decades.  See Elizabeth 
Arias, U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, United States Life Tables, 2006, 58 
NAT’L VITAL STATS. REPS., June 28, 2010, at 1, 4 fig.1 (showing growth of life 
expectancy for Americans between 1970 and 2006). 
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the appropriate discount rate for future benefits is 3% per year, then 
the above calculation yields this result: 
Future Benefit = WTP2011 • 1.03Years 
Recalling that present value equals 
Future Benefit / ( 1 + Discount Rate )Years, 
one next determines that 
Present Value = ( WTP2011 • 1.03Years ) / 1.03Years 
  = WTP2011 
The result is that, with a 3% discount rate, the present value of a 
human life, regardless of when in the future that life is saved, 
becomes precisely equal to the value of a life saved today once one 
accounts for health inflation.  Of course, one could quibble about the 
precise numbers selected, but the point is clear.  As long as health 
care costs are expected to inflate at a rate above general inflation—
and an increasing share of GDP devoted to health care seems widely 
expected,50 if not universally applauded—then current CBA 
calculations undervalue future lives at least somewhat.51 
If one uses an annual discount rate of 7%, then the present value of 
a life saved in ten years is worth about 51% of a present life, 
according to current CBA practices.  If health care inflation is 
considered, that same life saved in ten years is worth about 68% of a 
present life, meaning that accounting for health inflation increases the 
 
50 See, e.g., Henry J. Aaron & Isabel V. Sawhill, Bend the Revenue Curve: Health 
Reform Alone Won’t End Deficits, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2009, http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/12/AR2009101202389.html (supporting 
Obama’s health reform effort while acknowledging that, “as improved efficiency ‘bends’ 
the curve, the best we will be able to do is slow the growth of health-care spending”); 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE SPENDING 9–10 
(2007) (“In the absence of an unprecedented change in the long-term trends, national 
spending on health care will grow substantially over the coming decades.  . . .  [T]he 
excess cost growth rate for . . . spending on health care . . . in 2018 is assumed to equal the 
average of the rates from 1975 to 2005 . . . .”); Sean Keehan et al., Health Spending 
Projections Through 2017: The Baby-Boom Generation is Coming to Medicare, 27 
HEALTH AFF. w145, w146 exhibit 1 (2008), available at http://www.cnbcasia.com/images 
/documents/CMC%20Healthcare %20Study.PDF.  “Over the projection period in this 
paper (2007–2017), growth is anticipated to remain steady at around 6.7 percent per year   
. . . .”  Id. at w145. 
51 Because this argument rests on an assumption that health inflation will continue into 
the future, it is obviously weakened by evidence that the phenomenon is waning.  I believe 
health inflation will be with us for some time but must acknowledge that my argument will 
not persuade those who disagree with that presumption, perhaps correctly. 
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present value of 2021 lives by about 34%.  Accordingly, a proposed 
regulation that seems too expensive under current CBA practices 
might become a bargain when the benefits are recalculated.  Because 
human lives are often the only monetized benefits considered in a 
CBA,52 the verdict on many lifesaving regulations might be 
reversed.53  Under our current system, in which an agency’s expert 
scientific analysis will be reviewed by generalist appellate judges who 
may have no relevant scientific background, a procedural change that 
credibly increases the expected benefits of a proposed regulation 
should be especially welcome to agency staff eager to avoid seeing 
years of work undone by the judiciary.54 
To be sure, the link between rising health care expenditures and 
rising WTP—which if established would imply a link between rising 
health care expenditures and rising VSLs—may not be obvious.  
Health inflation justifies the inflation of future VSLs only if money 
spent on health care somehow demonstrates a similar “willingness” to 
 
52 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
53 In practice, the “verdicts” at issue are mostly determined before the CBA is even 
published, for regulators have little interest in publishing proposed regulations that will not 
be enacted.  Proper accounting for health inflation would decrease underregulation in two 
ways.  It would cause agencies to propose some regulations that otherwise might have 
been shelved after initial internal agency calculation of costs and benefits, and it would 
allow agencies to draft stronger versions (i.e., versions that cost regulated entities more) of 
regulations already likely to be proposed and enacted.  See Binyamin Appelbaum, As U.S. 
Agencies Put More Value on a Life, Businesses Fret, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/business/economy/17regulation.html (describing 
promulgation of “stricter and more expensive” regulation after an agency upwardly 
recalculated its VSL figure). 
54 For an example of lay judges rejecting a sensible regulation and consequentially 
dooming tens or hundreds of Americans to preventable cancer deaths, see Industrial Union 
Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980), commonly known as 
the “Benzene decision.”  In Benzene, the Supreme Court voted 5–4 to vacate an OSHA 
regulation that would have lowered the permissible workplace benzene exposure from ten 
parts per million (ppm) to one ppm, holding that the agency provided insufficient proof of 
the expected benefits.  Id. at 631 (“The evidence in the administrative record of adverse 
effects of benzene exposure at 10 ppm is sketchy at best.”).  Seven years later, OSHA 
promulgated an identical rule on the basis of additional scientific evidence.  See William J. 
Nicholson & Philip J. Landrigan, Quantitative Assessment of Lives Lost Due to Delay in 
the Regulation of Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 82 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 185, 187 
(calculating, among other harms, “that 30 to 105 premature leukemia deaths will 
eventually be caused by benzene exposures resulting from the delay in implementing a 1-
ppm standard between February 1978 and September 1987” and noting that the “number 
of excess deaths” could exceed 1000); see also Benzene, 448 U.S. at 688 (Marshall, J. 
dissenting) (correctly predicting that the “unfortunate consequence [of Benzene] is that the 
Federal Government’s efforts to protect American workers from cancer and other crippling 
diseases may be substantially impaired”). 
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trade money for longevity that economists assume exists when 
calculating VSLs on the basis of wage premiums and similar 
phenomena.  And while the concept of a wage premium is fairly 
straightforward, at least in the simple example provided above,55 the 
economics of health care could hardly be more complicated.  Below 
are but a few of the complications. 
1.  Agency 
Health care expenditures often involve middlemen, creating 
concerns about agency.  Because the amount of money spent on a 
person’s health is often affected by insurance companies,56 by 
government,57 and by patients’ family members,58 rather than by the 
person whose health is at issue, one might question whether money 
spent on a particular patient’s health reflects a true willingness of that 
person to “pay” for longevity.  Particularly when a patient pays no 
money at all for her health care,59 can one really ascribe her 
consumption of health care services to a willingness to pay for them? 
2.  International Comparisons 
During the debates over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act,60 observers noted that the American health care system is 
substantially less efficient than those of other industrialized nations.61  
 
55 See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.  In reality, determining a real-life wage 
premium—an essential precondition to using such a premium to calculate a VSL—is beset 
by confounding factors.  How can economists, for example, determine how dangerous two 
different jobs are?  Assuming such information is available to researchers, is it available to 
workers choosing among jobs?  What about transaction costs associated with changing 
jobs and acquiring safety information? 
56 Whether a procedure is performed may depend on whether an insurance company 
grants advance approval (i.e., agrees that the company will pay if the procedure is 
performed). 
57 Even in a nation without “death panels,” government actors affect health care 
spending through mechanisms like Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement rates, the 
approval process for drugs, and regulation of the health insurance business.  Also, actions 
taken by “the government” are themselves not easy to attribute to any particular person—
or even to a single branch of government. 
58 Family members make health care decisions for, among others, children and much of 
the elderly.  Nonrelatives, such as guardians ad litem, act on behalf of additional patients. 
59 Consider an indigent person who arrives at the emergency room, receives care, and 
then pays nothing to the hospital. 
60 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).  This Act is the health care reform bill 
signed by President Obama in March 2010. 
61 See Maggie Fox, U.S. Scores Dead Last Again in Healthcare Study, REUTERS (July 
23, 2010), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/23/us-usa-healthcare-last   
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The Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom achieve 
comparable results (as measured by the health of their populations) 
while spending far less money than the United States.62  If health care 
spending reflects willingness to pay and accordingly translates into 
VSLs, the implication would be that Americans are willing to pay 
more for their lives than are the citizens of countries boasting more 
efficient health care systems.  If true, then the life of an American 
would be more “valuable” for purposes of CBA calculations than the 
life of someone in the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, or the United 
Kingdom.  Perhaps such American exceptionalism is justified.  If not, 
however, the substitution of health care expenses for WTP becomes 
problematic. 
3.  Ignorance 
Even if we assume that a patient spends her own money on health, 
chooses for herself what care to purchase, and participates in a 
reasonably efficient health care marketplace—that is, if we ignore 
agency problems and shelve concerns about international 
comparisons—honest observers must recognize that health care 
consumers lack information essential to evaluating the worth of 
medical treatments.  Even trained physicians cannot know of every 
latest change in drugs, devices, procedures, and other care options, 
much less the marginal utility of adopting one over another.  And 
while in theory a patient could educate herself extensively about her 
options, such study costs time and money, causing a rational 
participant in the health care market (should such a person exist) to 
sensibly rely on the advice of health care professionals.  In addition, a 
patient otherwise inclined to devote substantial effort to self-
education will likely defer to others upon having a sudden heart 
attack. 
Must we then reject health care expenses as a substitute for 
“willingness to pay” in the calculation of the value of statistical lives, 
leaving us with wage premiums and similarly weak data?63  I think 
 
-idUSTRE65M0SU20100623 (“Americans spend twice as much as residents of other 
developed countries on healthcare, but get lower quality, less efficiency and have the least 
equitable system.”). 
62 KAREN DAVIS ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, MIRROR ON THE WALL: HOW THE 
PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM COMPARES INTERNATIONALLY, at v–
vii (2010), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications 
/Fund%20Report/2010/Jun/1400_Davis_Mirror_Mirror_on_the_wall_2010.pdf. 
63 See supra note 55. 
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not.  When considering VSLs, one must remember that the lives are 
statistical, not real.  When the Federal Railroad Administration 
projects saving “the loss of . . . half of the value of a statistical life 
each year,”64 readers understand that no “half person” will be saved 
from a train crash because of the proposed FRA regulation.  Although 
some have criticized the common agency practice of adopting a single 
VSL and using that number in all regulatory impact analyses,65 the 
practice persists.  When a coal miner’s wage premium is used to 
calculate a VSL, the result is not the value of the miner’s life but 
rather a number used for all Americans.  Similarly, health care 
expenses do not illuminate the “value” of any specific patient’s life—
nor the assessment of that value by her doctor, insurer, government, 
or herself.  Instead, just as the total outlays devoted to road 
construction and maintenance demonstrate Americans’ collective 
interest in road building and repair, so do our total outlays on health 
care demonstrate our collective interest in maintaining our health and 
prolonging our lives.  If one state spends more money per capita than 
another on roads, observers could fairly conclude that, all other things 
being equal, the higher-spending state values roads more than the 
lower-spending state.  Agency problems can obscure the value placed 
on roads by any specific resident of either state, but the collective 
valuation is made clear by collective action.  Similarly, just as the 
United States values military equipment far more than any other 
nation,66 the United States actually does value health care more than 
the United Kingdom does.67  If the United Kingdom enjoys greater 
efficiency, its doctors and citizens should be proud of their thrift, but 
the balance sheet is clear: Americans are willing to pay more.  Do 
Americans desire greater efficiency?  Perhaps.  Regardless, that 
desired efficiency is not currently available to Americans, and we 
have collectively decided to pay what we must to get the care we 
want. 
 
64 See supra text accompanying note 20. 
65 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 7. 
66 Gerard O’Dwyer, World Military Spending Rose by 5.9% in ’09: SIPRI, DEFENSE 
NEWS (June 8, 2010), http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4661977 (“The United 
States retained its position as the world’s biggest spender, investing $661 billion on 
military equipment in 2009.  This represented 43 percent of the total global spend . . . .”). 
67 Again, this Article accepts the premises of CBA and the use of VSL, among which is 
the principle that the value one places on something is equal to how much money one 
spends on it. 
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As noted above,68 some uncertainty surrounds the future of 
American health expenditures.  Indeed, federal budget projections 
vary tremendously depending on assumptions concerning future 
health spending.69  For purposes of CBA calculations, however, the 
uncertainty is less significant because the time window is narrower.  
While budget projections offer guesses many decades into the 
future,70 CBAs created by regulatory agencies commonly estimate 
costs and benefits over only ten or twenty years, a period in which 
health care expenses are more predictable.71  Accordingly, while a 
critic might sensibly observe that health care cost inflation cannot 
outpace general inflation forever—otherwise the entire economy will 
one day consist of health care provision—a federal agency preparing 
a regulatory impact analysis today need not worry about the expected 
rate of health inflation in 2050.  Instead, if health inflation is expected 
to exist during the time period covered by the cost-benefit analysis 
prepared for a particular proposed regulation, something almost 
surely true for any regulation proposed in the coming decade, the 
agency proposing the regulation should properly account for the 
expected economic reality.72 
B.  Human Lives in Rich Countries Improve over Time 
Current CBA discounting further undervalues future lives because 
discounters ignore rising per capita wealth in developed countries.  
Because the “willingness to pay” for safety is at least somewhat 
correlated with wealth, richer countries should use higher VSLs when 
assessing policies.73  Yet, when valuing the lives of persons saved in 
 
68 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
69 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 27 (2010), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=11579&zzz=40884. 
70 See id. at app. A (offering projections through 2080). 
71 See id. at 28 (“CBO’s projections of health care spending for the next few decades 
probably provide more real information than its projections for the longer term.”). 
72 Agencies deciding to consider health inflation during CBA calculations today might 
well reevaluate their decision a decade or two from now if the health care “cost curve” has 
been “bent” sufficiently that health inflation is predicted to disappear.  The prospect that a 
policy appropriate today might require revision if conditions change in twenty years is not, 
however, a good excuse for rejecting the proposed policy now. 
73 Again, this Article attacks the economics of current CBA practices on their own 
terms.  A normative critique might well question whether the lives of the rich should count 
more than those of the poor.  E.g., DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 97–98 (1996) (“[P]references in cost-
benefit analysis are weighted with dollars, and the poor have fewer of these.  Exactly those 
people whom it seems policymakers should be most concerned to protect are those who 
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the future, CBA calculators do not account for the growth of GDP in 
excess of inflation and population growth.74  Developed countries, 
such as the United States, see increases in real GDP (that is, GDP 
adjusted for inflation) nearly every year.75  Indeed, a drop in real 
GDP causes great alarm.76  Although part of increased GDP results 
from population growth, the United States has enjoyed rising real 
GDP per capita for decades,77 with an annual increase of about 
1.8%.78  Accordingly, the economic output of each American rises 
over time, even in inflation-adjusted dollars.79  Gains in output are 
divided among business profits, employee wages, and taxation, 
meaning that almost every year, the average American sees a real 
increase in the total money coming to her from profits (if, for 
 
are most likely to be harmed.” (citation omitted)); Robert H. Frank, Melding Sociology 
and Economics: James Coleman’s Foundations of Social Theory, 30 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 147, 160 (1992) (agreeing that it “is probably true, as critics of cost-benefit 
analysis complain, that the willingness-to-pay criterion systematically favors the interests 
of the rich” and defending that practice on the ground that “the poor can be compensated 
by simply lowering their tax rates”). 
74 For a pithy explanation of this neglect, see James Kwak, Doing Discounting Wrong, 
THE BASELINE SCENARIO (Feb. 16, 2010), http://baselinescenario.com/2010/02/16/doing  
-discounting-wrong/ (criticizing CBA practices because “the real value of lives is 
continually increasing”). 
75 See Real GDP, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/research 
/directors_charts/pi_9.pdf (last updated Mar. 25, 2011).  GDP is defined as “the market 
value of all the final goods produced in the entire country in the course of a year.”  PAUL 
HEYNE ET AL., THE ECONOMIC WAY OF THINKING 352 (10th ed. 2002); see also National 
Income and Product Accounts Table: Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product, BUREAU OF 
ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, http://www.bea.gov/national 
/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=5&ViewSeries=NO&Java=no&Request3Place 
=N&3Place=N&FromView=YES&Freq=Year&FirstYear=1929&LastYear=2009&3Place
=N&Update=Update&JavaBox=no (last updated Apr. 28, 2011). 
76 See, e.g., Marcus Walker, Record GDP Drop Sharpens Pain Across Euro Zone, 
WALL ST. J., May 16, 2009, at A5. 
77 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF GDP 
PER CAPITA AND PER EMPLOYED PERSON 12 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://www.bls.gov 
/fls/flsgdp.pdf (showing that United States real GDP per capita nearly tripled between 
1960 and 2008). 
78 Id. at 13 tbl.2. 
79 Increased per capita output is largely caused by increased productivity.  See JOHN M. 
ROBERTS, FED. RESERVE, ESTIMATES OF THE PRODUCTIVITY TREND USING TIME-
VARYING PARAMETER TECHNIQUES (2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov 
/pubs/feds/2001/200108/200108pap.pdf; Rafael Doménech & Víctor Gómez, Estimating 
Potential Output, Core Inflation, and the NAIRU as Latent Variables, 24 J. BUS. & ECON. 
STAT. 354 (2006); Productivity Change in the Nonfarm Business Sector, 1947–2010, U.S. 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., http://www.bls.gov/lpc/prodybar.htm (last modified Mar. 3, 
2011) (showing annual productivity increases averaging above 2% since 1990). 
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example, she owns shares in for-profit companies), pay, and 
government outlays.80 
Any calculation of a VSL that incorporates “willingness to pay” for 
safety or “willingness to accept” risk will tend to place greater value 
on persons with more disposable money.  The reason is simple: 
Willingness to pay for goods increases when one has money in the 
first place (or at least has access to credit).  Only someone with 
money can exhibit willingness to part with it.  Similarly, the toleration 
of harms—such as dirty air or dangerous working conditions that a 
government agency might regulate—in exchange for money should 
increase with poverty.81  One does not hear news accounts of bankers 
selling kidneys.82 
A simple example illustrates the principle.  If we assume an annual 
increase in real per capita GDP of 1.8%,83 then for every $1000 
 
80 Much depends on the definition of the “average” American.  Regardless, the fruits of 
increased output are going back into the economy one way or another, even if they are not 
distributed in an equitable manner. 
81 The society-wide existence of this phenomenon—that is, the tendency for richer 
countries to spend more on clean air and other environmental benefits—is well 
documented.  For example, the “environmental Kuznets curve” illustrates a theory that, as 
a country’s economy grows, pollution increases, peaks, and then eventually decreases.  
Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and the Environment, 110 Q.J. 
ECON. 353, 370 (1995).  The relationship of pollution to economic growth resembles the 
“inverted U” of the original Kuznets curve, which concerns the relationship between 
income distribution inequality and economic growth.  See id. at 363; Simon Kuznets, 
Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 18 (1955) (suggesting 
that, as a country’s economy develops over time, income inequality will rise, peak, and 
then decrease).  The upshot of the environmental Kuznets curve theory is that economic 
growth does not inevitably result in degradation of the environment.  Grossman & 
Krueger, supra.  Scholars have questioned, however, whether the theory holds up in an era 
of global climate change.  See, e.g., Jie He & Patrick Richard, Environmental Kuznets 
Curve for CO2 in Canada, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1083, 1083–85 (2010). 
82 Compare Larry Rohter, The Organ Trade: A Global Black Market; Tracking the Sale 
of a Kidney on a Path of Poverty and Hope, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at A1 (following 
a kidney from Recife, Brazil, to Brooklyn), with Graham Bowley, With Big Profit, 
Goldman Sees Big Payday Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2009, at A1 (“Goldman . . . 
announced that it had earmarked $11.4 billion so far this year to compensate its 
workers.”). 
83 See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 186 tbl.A17 (2010) 
(predicting real GDP growth of 2.4% annually in advanced economies); Sewell Chan, No 
Fed Plans to Give More Support, Bernanke Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2010, at B1 (“The 
Fed expects the economy to grow this year by 3 to 3.5 percent, picking up only slightly, to 
3.5 to 4.5 percent, in 2011 and 2012.”); Neil H. Buchanan, What Do We Owe Future 
Generations?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1237, 1273 (2009) (“Even with the aging of Baby 
Boomers, changes in productivity will apparently be more than sufficient to offset the 
demographic changes and allow future GDP per capita to grow dramatically over the next 
seventy-five years and perhaps beyond.”). 
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produced by each person in the United States today, each American in 
ten years will produce $1195.84  When the increased output returns to 
the economy in profits, wages, and government outlays, Americans 
will have that much more real wealth to spend.  All things being 
equal, someone in 2021 would pay $1195 to avoid a risk that 
someone would pay $1000 to avoid today.  The “wealth-adjusted” 
value of a 2021 benefit is therefore 19.5% greater than the same 
benefit today, at least before discounting. 
Much as the section concerning health inflation depends on the 
assumption that health inflation will continue to exist,85 the argument 
presented here concerning rising real GDP per capita will not 
convince those who expect real GDP per capita to remain flat (or even 
decrease) into the future.  Again, I believe my assumption is a fair one 
but recognize that rejection of the assumption vitiates my argument.86 
Next, one can apply discounting to these figures.  If one ignores 
increased future wealth and then imagines a future harm of the kind 
Americans today would pay $1000 to ameliorate, the present value of 
removing the future harm in 2021 is equal to 
Future Benefit / ( 1 + Discount Rate )Years 
which, with a discount rate of 7%,87 equals 
$1000 / ( 1 + 0.07 )10 = $508 
 
84 The 2021 figure is in inflation-adjusted dollars, meaning that ten years from now 
Americans will likely be about 20% more productive than today.  Increased productivity is 
made possible by technological advances that increase worker efficiency, increased hours 
spent working, or some combination. 
85 See supra note 51. 
86 While theories such as “peak oil” or an inevitable “clash of civilizations” predict an 
impending long-term drop in living standards, I take comfort in the record of past 
doomsayers.  See, e.g., THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 
(1798) (predicting that British population could not grow beyond eighteenth century levels 
without depressing the standard of living); PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB xi 
(1968) (predicting that in “the 1970’s . . . hundreds of millions of people are going to 
starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon” and advocating “population 
control [in the United States] hopefully through a system of incentives and penalties, but 
by compulsion if voluntary methods fail”); see also WILLIAM FAULKNER, Nobel Prize 
Address, in THE FAULKNER READER 3, 4 (1954) (“I believe that man will not merely 
endure: he will prevail.”). 
87 This example uses a discount rate of 7%, and the example in Part II.A used 3%.  
Different rates have been chosen to reflect the multiple rates commonly provided in 
agency CBAs.  See supra note 40.  Regardless of the discount rate chosen, future lives are 
undervalued when agencies ignore health inflation and wealth inflation. 
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If the future benefit is valued at $1195 instead of $1000—that is, if 
the benefit calculation accounts for the increased wealth of future 
Americans—then the value of removing the future harm in 2021 is 
equal to 
Future Benefit / ( 1 + Discount Rate )Years 
which, with a discount rate of 7%, equals 
$1195 / ( 1 + 0.07 )10 = $607 
The failure to use wealth-adjusted WTP and WTA figures when 
calculating the future benefits of health and safety regulations thereby 
leads to an undervaluation of about 16% for benefits obtained in 
2021.  For benefits accruing in twenty years, the undervaluation is 
about 30%.88 
In addition, future Americans will likely devote at least part of 
their extra income directly to risk reduction.  One cannot predict with 
any certainty what wealthier Americans will do with their additional 
real dollars.  If history is any guide, however, they will spend those 
dollars on one thing or another.89  Absent good evidence that no 
increased wealth will cover safety costs, CBA calculators cannot 
justify their inattention to future purchasing power.  Especially as the 
quality of safety technology improves—which seems nearly certain to 
occur, at least for those who can afford it—it would be bizarre for 
Americans enjoying unprecedented wealth to skimp on their own 
safety. 
Indeed, evidence abounds of Americans choosing to spend 
increasing amounts of money on safety.  Automobiles, for example, 
come standard today with safety technology unavailable at any price 
just a few decades ago.90  Child car seats, unknown to drivers of 
 
88 The calculation is 1.018 to the twentieth power, which equals 1.43, meaning real per 
capita U.S. GDP in 2031 is projected to be 1.43 times that of today.  Removing this factor 
when assessing future benefits causes an undervaluation of about 30%, calculated as  
1 – (1 / 1.43) 
89 See Martin Feldstein, The Return of Saving, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 87, 87 (2006) (“The 
savings rate of American households has been declining for more than a decade and 
recently turned negative.”); Kathleen Pender, Personal Saving Rate Drops to Zero 
Percent, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 7, 2005, http://articles.sfgate.com/2005-08-07/business 
/17388187_1_stanford-institute-federal-reserve-data-economic-policy-research/2. 
90 See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2010) (regulating, among other safety devices, mandatory 
air bags); Key Dates in the History of Automobile Air Bags, USA TODAY, July 8, 1996, at 
3B (“1971: Ford builds experimental air bag fleet”); see also RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT 
ANY SPEED (1965). 
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previous generations, are so commonplace as to be required by law.91  
Manufacturers offer particularly safe vehicles to buyers willing to pay 
extra.92  These devices cost money, and Americans have decided to 
pay for them.93  Increased presence of safety equipment is of course 
not limited to cars.  The automatic external defibrillator present not 
only on ambulances and in hospitals but also in a growing number of 
restaurants and other public places was invented in the early 1970s.94  
Users of bicycle helmets, ski equipment, and mountain climbing gear 
enjoy substantially greater safety than was available in the recent past.  
The same is true of purchasers of innumerable other products.  Before 
1972, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) did not even 
exist.95  Current CPSC regulations cover 15,000 kinds of consumer 
products.96  One may presume that such regulations would not be 
necessary if consumer product manufacturers were adopting the 
mandated specifications absent legal compulsion, and the absence of 
such voluntary adoption strongly suggests that the legal requirements 
impose at least some costs on producers.  Both through their 
government and through individual purchasing choices, Americans 
have demonstrated increased concern about risk over time—concern 
that translates into increased willingness to pay for safety. 
When one combines the effects of health inflation and wealth-
adjusted future WTP, the undervaluation of future benefits in current 
CBA practice becomes especially stark.  Using the 3% figure from 
above for excess health inflation (that is, the rate at which health care 
costs increase above general inflation) and 1.8% for increased per 
 
91 E.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c (McKinney 2010); see also 49 C.F.R. § 
571.213 (2010). 
92 See, e.g., INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, SHOPPING FOR A SAFER CAR 2011 
(2011), available at http://www.iihs.org/brochures/pdf/sfsc.pdf.  Consider the reputation of 
Volvo, which sells expensive cars known for safety. 
93 The decision to pay for mandatory items was made collectively.  In general, however, 
safety devices exist for some time—and are purchased voluntarily—before regulators 
require their use. 
94 See Pete Bysom, Retired Portland Physician Dies at 85, OREGONIAN, Aug. 28, 1993, 
at D5. 
95 See Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 4, 86 Stat. 1207, 1210 (1972) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 2053) (creating CPSC). 
96 See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, 
http://www.cpsc.gov/about/faq.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011); 16 C.F.R. ch. II (2011) 
(codifying regulations on products from cigarette lighters to pacifiers to swimming pool 
slides). 
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capita GDP,97 the future value of a benefit can be calculated as 
follows: The future value of a benefit equals the value Americans 
would assign to the same benefit available today, increased each year 
by a factor of 1.03 and a factor of 1.018.98  As an equation: 
Benefitfuture = Benefitpresent • 1.03years • 1.018years 
  = Benefitpresent • 1.049years 
A benefit that would be worth $1000 today would therefore be 
worth about $1606 to Americans able to obtain the benefit in 2021.  
With an annual discount rate of 7%, the present value of the $1606 
future benefit equals $816.  If one instead calculated the present value 
of receiving only $1000 in 2021, the result would be $508, an 
undervaluation of about 38%.  And if one uses a discount rate of 
4.9%,99 then the discounting of future lives is completely 
counteracted by the proper attention to health inflation and rising 
wealth. 
Unless CBA calculators can justify their failure to account for 
health inflation and increasing per capita real GDP, they should 
immediately begin increasing the future value of future health and 
safety benefits.  While controversy would remain as to what discount 
rate is appropriate when determining the present value of such future 
benefits, a CBA that correctly values future benefits will find more 
accurate present values for any correctly chosen discount rate, and 
current practice arbitrarily reduces the values of future benefits. 
C.  Weaknesses 
The brevity of this Article, along with its use of equations, may 
obscure some weaknesses in its argument that deserve attention.100  
Perhaps most important, the two factors identified as causing 
 
97 Note that the figure of 1.8% is another conservative assumption.  If we were to use 
productivity instead of per capita real GDP, the annual increase would exceed 2%.  See 
supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
98 The factors combine for an annual increase of about 4.9%. 
99 Although this number is suggested to match the calculation above, it is not far-
fetched.  Many scholars advocate using far lower rates.  See, e.g., Kwak, supra note 74 
(proposing a discount rate of 1%); see also INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST 
OF CARBON, U.S. GOV’T, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 
FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at 23 (2010) 
(“[W]e use three discount rates to span a plausible range of certainty-equivalent constant 
discount rates: 2.5, 3, and 5 percent per year.”). 
100 These weaknesses are in addition to the concerns raised supra notes 51, 83. 
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overdiscounting of human lives as opposed to other future goods—
health inflation and rising per capita GDP—are related to one another 
and are difficult to separate completely for purposes of analysis.  For 
example, perhaps health inflation is possible because of increased 
wealth, and we see continued health inflation because a society that 
has already covered many of its most basic needs can devote much of 
any additional surplus to health care.101  In addition, money spent on 
health care is not precisely equal to money spent on health.  If 
administrative overhead is the cause of all (or even most) health 
inflation,102 then increased spending is not as good an indicator of 
willingness to pay to avoid risks of death.  Further, some money spent 
on health care is not strongly related to saving lives.  The availability 
of laser vision correction surgery may contribute to health inflation by 
causing Americans to spend money on a procedure that previously did 
not exist, but unless laser-corrected eyes prevent fatal accidents better 
than old-fashioned eye glasses, paying for surgery does not indicate 
much, if anything, about the patient’s “willingness to pay” to avoid 
fatal risks, which is the willingness used to calculate a VSL.103 
These critiques are fair, at least in part.  While we cannot run an 
experiment to determine if a parallel United States would have 
experienced health inflation in recent decades even in the absence of 
rising per capita wealth, it is likely true that at least some portion of 
health inflation is attributable to rising wealth.  If the “Great 
Recession” were to deepen and endure for years, chances are that 
health inflation would be checked if only out of necessity.104  
 
101 In other words, one might argue that health inflation should be included among the 
forms of safety technology discussed in Part II.B, such as safer cars.  See Robert E. Hall & 
Charles I. Jones, The Value of Life and the Rise in Health Spending, 122 Q.J. ECON. 39 
(2007). 
102 I cannot imagine that this is true—treatment options today seem so clearly superior 
to those of the past, even the recent past—but I am neither a doctor nor a health economist 
and will leave the dispute to others. 
103 Cosmetic procedures such as Botox injections are another example of novel health 
care expenses unrelated to preventing fatalities. 
104 While the federal government can borrow at low rates, many states are prohibited by 
their constitutions from deficit spending, meaning that when revenues fall (as they do 
during recessions), expenses must drop, and health expenses of states and their political 
subdivisions are no exception.  See, e.g., Li Lou, Budget Cuts Squeeze Home Health Care 
Workers, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 26, 2009, http://www.sacbee.com/2009/07/26/2054581 
/budget-cuts-squeeze-home-health.html; Editorial, Helping States Make Good Choices, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, at A20 (“Since a majority of state constitutions require 
balanced budgets, the only alternatives are to raise taxes or cut spending.  To cope, many 
states are spending less on health care and education, which take up a large percentage of 
most state budgets.”). 
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Because the amount of overlap between health inflation and wealth 
inflation is something about which reasonable persons can disagree, 
federal agencies might sensibly adopt different figures when deciding 
how much to inflate future VSLs before discounting their monetary 
worth to present value.  Just as federal agencies choose varying 
discount rates based on their own calculations and public policy 
judgments, so too may they choose divergent VSL inflation rates.105  
Even if every bit of health inflation were somehow attributable to 
rising per capita wealth—an implausible assumption because at least 
some health inflation must be caused by consumption of newly 
available therapies106—VSL inflation would nonetheless be justified 
by the rate of wealth inflation. 
A more sweeping critique might begin with the premise that 
overregulation kills, and anything tending to decrease the apparent 
benefits of proposed regulation serves to ameliorate the problem of 
unduly burdensome regulation.107  For example, critics of the Food 
and Drug Administration argue that the lengthy approval process for 
drugs and devices causes needless deaths by denying patients 
lifesaving cures.108  And complaints of overregulation are common in 
 
105 The appropriate VSL inflation rate should become a subject commonly addressed in 
comments made to agencies that have proposed regulations.  Regulated entities and other 
advocacy groups have strong interests in seeing their preferred figures selected and will 
therefore have incentives to justify their proposals in thoughtful submissions. 
106 In a society with no real increase in wealth, residents would nonetheless spend more 
on health care over time (by shifting consumption from other goods and services to health 
care) unless no new drugs, devices, or techniques became available that are both expensive 
and worth the price. 
107 See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and 
Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 407 (1990) (describing what 
the author characterized as “self-defeating regulatory strategies—strategies that achieve an 
end precisely opposite to the one intended, or to the only public-regarding justification that 
can be brought forward in their support”). 
108 See, e.g., James L. Zelenay, Jr., The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster 
Food and Drug Administration Always a Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD 
& DRUG L.J. 261, 273 & nn.109–10 (2005) (listing certain FDA delays that may have cost 
tens of thousands of lives); Richard A. Deyo, Gaps, Tensions, and Conflicts in the FDA 
Approval Process: Implications for Clinical Practice, 17 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 142, 
146 (2004) (“[M]anufacturers argue that the agency drags its feet and kills people waiting 
for new cures.”).  But see Gardiner Harris, Diabetes Drug Maker Hid Test Data, Files 
Indicate, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2010, at A1 (“[D]ocuments demonstrate that the company 
had data hinting at Avandia’s extensive heart problems almost as soon as the drug was 
introduced in 1999, and sought intensively to keep those risks from becoming public.”). 
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American political discourse.109  Even advocates for workplace safety 
occasionally object to regulations they believe will cost an 
unreasonable number of jobs.110  If the United States truly regulates 
too much, however, the solution is not to create arbitrary errors in the 
calculation of the costs and benefits of regulation.  Instead, those 
convinced that America suffers from surplus regulation instead of 
insufficient concern for human life should advance their arguments on 
the merits.  Particularly in the context of cost-benefit analysis, which 
already accepts the premise that human lives can be assigned a price 
and that the price should be based upon factors such as wage 
premiums that value rich persons above poor ones, stacking the deck 
further with a systematic devaluation of human lives is not justified. 
Another potential weakness concerns traditional economic 
arguments about the marginal utility of money.  Put simply, the more 
money a person has, the less her position is improved by receiving an 
additional dollar.  The “utility” of the dollar decreases as the wealth 
of the recipient increases.  Accordingly, if—as is argued above—
Americans are likely to become richer over time,111 then the marginal 
utility of their money will decrease, implying that a higher discount 
rate is appropriate.112  It is worth recalling, however, that VSLs are 
calculated not on the basis of utility but instead on the basis of dollars.  
In other words, when an economist determines someone’s 
“willingness to pay” for a reduction of risk, the WTP number reflects 
 
109 E.g., 156 CONG. REC. S3,952-02 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
McConnell) (“The fact is, Washington can’t even pay its bills.  Yet over the last 16 months 
it has taken over banks, insurance companies, car companies, the student loan business, 
and health care.  Now it has its sights set on anyone in America who engages in a financial 
transaction.”); Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, FCC Head Warns of Regulatory Excess, FIN. 
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009, at 3 (quoting a Bush administration official warning the new 
administration that, “with too much of an interventionist approach, you could actually 
deter people from investing in the infrastructure”). 
110 See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 537 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) 
(“[T]he intervening union argues, with some persuasiveness, that ill health effects resulting 
from the prolonged unemployment of the head of the family on a closing of the Reserve 
facility may be more certain than the harm from drinking Lake Superior water or breathing 
Silver Bay air.”). 
111 See supra notes 73–86 and accompanying text. 
112 See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 
35 (2007) (“[I]f consumption grows, people are better off in the future than they are now 
and an extra unit of consumption is generally taken to be worth less.”).  The theory is that 
the present value of a dollar projected to be delivered in the future should be discounted to 
reflect the minimal impact of that dollar on the wealthy recipient’s utility.  THE STERN 
REVIEW eventually settles on a discount rate close to zero, largely for ethical reasons.  Id. 
at 49–50, 54. 
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how much money is actually spent on, for example, safe cars.  When 
an economist determines someone’s “willingness to accept” risk in 
exchange for money, the WTA number reflects how much money is 
actually paid as a “wage premium.”  These WTP and WTA figures 
are then used to calculate the values of statistical lives.  If anything, 
the decreased marginal utility of future wealth should increase the 
amount future Americans are willing to pay to avoid risk.  The extra 
money enjoyed by our rich descendants, who will already enjoy 
material comforts greater than our own, can easily be diverted to 
avoiding risks of early death.  After all, what good is a big house or a 
fancy car to someone not alive to enjoy them?113 
III 
SOME ILLUSTRATIONS 
Two illustrations should help to demonstrate the practical 
importance of the proper calculations of regulatory benefits.  The first 
concerns potential regulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) under the 
Clean Air Act.  The second revisits the NASA asteroid deflector 
discussed in Part II.B. 
A.  Regulation of GHGs in Response to Climate Change 
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that greenhouse 
gases are air pollutants covered by the Clean Air Act.114  The EPA 
was accordingly required to determine whether GHG emissions from 
cars “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 
 
113 It may be true that a more rigorous calculation of the interests of future generations 
would consider the marginal (as opposed to the total) amount of consumption across time 
periods.  See id. at 35–36 (quoting Robert M. Solow, The Economics of Resources or the 
Resources of Economics, 64 AM. ECON. REV., May 1974, at 1, 9) (arguing that even if the 
welfare of future generations is valued as highly as that of our own, we should “discount 
future consumption if we expect[] the future to be richer than the present.”).  That said, 
such criticisms apply also to the current calculation of VSLs based on WTP and WTA 
data.  For example, if a poor person is “willing to pay” only a small amount to avoid risk, 
his WTP is small, but the marginal utility (to him) of the dollars he is willing to pay is 
large.  If agencies were to calculate “utility” rather than dollars during the CBA process, 
regulations expected to help the poor (for example, by toughening air quality standards for 
trash incinerators, which tend to be in poor neighborhoods) would suddenly seem more 
cost-beneficial.  For now, however, agencies seem focused on willingness to pay money, 
not on the utility of the money one is willing to pay, and this Article operates under that 
premise. 
114 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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welfare” and, if so, what regulations are appropriate.115  Having 
already issued an “endangerment finding” concluding that GHGs 
indeed pose a threat to public health, 116 the Agency has begun its 
regulatory response.117  The full extent of the EPA’s response 
remains uncertain, and any significant regulation is sure to be 
challenged.118 
Accordingly, the EPA will face tremendous pressure—both from 
outside groups and from employees eager to avoid wasting effort on 
vacated regulations—to ensure that any climate change rules have 
monetary benefits that exceed their costs.  A federal Interagency 
Working Group has already produced an estimate of the “social cost 
of carbon (SCC)” emissions, “to allow agencies to incorporate the 
social benefits of reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions into cost-
benefit analyses of regulatory actions that have small, or ‘marginal,’ 
impacts on cumulative global emissions.”119  Among the costs of 
climate change—and, accordingly, the benefits of regulations that 
combat climate change—are negative human health outcomes.120  As 
is common in discussions of regulatory costs and benefits, the 
Interagency Working Group discounted the present value of the social 
 
115 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (“The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe . . . 
standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from . . . new motor vehicles or . . 
. engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”). 
116 See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I) (“The Administrator also finds that the combined emissions of 
these greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines 
contribute to the greenhouse gas air pollution that endangers public health and welfare 
under CAA section 202(a).”). 
117 See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 
49 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600) (promulgating, along with National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, regulations on GHG emissions from passenger cars, pickup trucks, sport-
utility vehicles, minivans, and passenger vans). 
118 See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Senate Rejects Republican Effort to Thwart Carbon Limits, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, at A22 (“The Senate voted 53–47 to reject an attempt by 
Senator Lisa Murkowski, Republican of Alaska, to block the E.P.A. from imposing new 
limits on carbon emissions based on its 2009 finding that such gases from industry, 
vehicles and other sources represent a threat to human health and the environment.”); 
Jenna Greene, Air Assault: 38 Suits Filed over New Greenhouse Gas Rules, NAT’L L.J., 
June 14, 2010, at 1. 
119 INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, supra note 99, at 1. 
120 Id. (stating that the SCC estimate “is intended to include (but is not limited to) 
changes in net agricultural productivity, human health, property damages from increased 
flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services due to climate change”). 
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cost of carbon emitted in the future.121  The report contains a fairly 
robust discussion of discounting, noting the particular problems that 
arise when one discounts benefits expected to accrue to future 
generations.122  The discussion concludes, “In light of disagreement 
in the literature on the appropriate market interest rate to use in this 
context and uncertainty about how interest rates may change over 
time, we use three discount rates to span a plausible range of 
certainty-equivalent constant discount rates: 2.5, 3, and 5% per 
year.”123  The Working Group has rejected the commonly employed 
discount rate of 7%, but even the lowest annual discount rate 
proposed, 2.5%, will vastly decrease the present value of many 
benefits associated with preventing severe anthropogenic climate 
change. 
Consider the effects of various discount rates on benefits predicted 
to arrive twenty years in the future.  For benefits whose future value is 
$100 million, the present value is displayed below.124 
Table 1.  Valuation of benefits twenty years in the future 
Discount Rate 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 5.0% 
Present Value 
(in millions) 
$100 $81.95 $67.30 $61.03 $55.37 $37.69 
In short, the effect is tremendous.  A discount rate of 2% cuts the 
present value by about one-third.  Increasing the discount rate to 
2.5%—the lowest rate used by the Working Group—reduces present 
value of the $100 million by almost two-fifths.  And so on along the 
table. 
The effect on more distant benefits is even more severe.  The 
following table displays the present value of benefits expected to 
arrive in fifty years, with a future value of $100 million. 
 
121 Or, from the other perspective, the Working Group discounted the benefits of 
preventing such emissions. 
122 INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, supra note 99, at 17. 
123 Id. at 23. 
124 Again, the formula is 
Present Value =  Future Benefit / ( 1 + Discount Rate )Years  
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Table 2.  Valuation of benefits fifty years in the future 
Discount Rate 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 5.0% 
Present Value 
(in millions) 
$100 $60.80 $37.15 $29.09 $22.81 $8.72 
The 5% annual discount rate destroys more than 90% of the present 
value.  Even the 2.5% rate destroys more than three-fifths of the 
present value. 
For any proposed climate change regulation, at least some of the 
expected benefits should come in improved human health and saved 
lives.  If regulators continue to discount human health and lives as 
they do dollars, the true present value of these future benefits will be 
vastly understated, leading to an inadequate response to a colossal 
environmental peril.  Agencies preparing regulatory impact analyses 
for climate change rules should properly account for the increased 
value of human life and health in the future.  By recognizing that 
according to the economic assumptions underlying CBA, future 
American VSLs should be greater than those measured today, 
regulators can increase their estimates of the expected future benefits 
of proposed rules.  The increased future benefits, regardless of the 
discount rate chosen, will have greater present values than would 
benefits calculated with no consideration of health inflation and 
increased wealth. 
B.  Revisiting the NASA Asteroid Deflector 
Earlier, the power of discounting was demonstrated by an 
illustration of how economists might deem it wasteful to spend one 
hundred dollars today to save the entire planet in one thousand 
years.125  The table below shows the present value of saving the Earth 
under a few different sets of assumptions.  The left column displays 
 
125 See supra Part II.B.  The standard formula of  
Present Value = Future Benefit / ( 1 + Discount Rate )Years  
reveals that with a discount rate of 3.5%, the value of saving nine billion lives in one 
thousand years equals  
( $6.3 x 1016 ) / ( 1.0351000 ) = $72.28 
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discount rates, and the top row displays a factor used to increase the 
future value of human lives.126 
Table 3.  Accounting for increased VSLs in the future: present dollar value (in 2011) of 































































The bottom row of Table 3, which uses a 5.0% discount rate (the 
highest suggested by the cost of carbon working group), shows that 
VSL inflation of even a few percent per year completely changes the 
cost-benefit figures for the NASA proposal.  Similar effects are seen 
with other discount rates.  Instead of discovering that spending one 
hundred dollars is wasteful—as is seen with a 3.5% discount rate and 
zero VSL inflation—with a 5.0% discount rate and a 3.0% VSL 
inflation figure, the benefits of deflecting the asteroid have a present 
value of $280 million.  Increasing the VSL inflation figure to 4.0% 
 
126 The VSL inflation figures in the top row of the table represent the product of 
expected health inflation and expected real growth in GDP per capita.  For example, with 
expected health inflation of 1% and expected real GDP per capita growth of 2%, the result 
would be 
1.01 • 1.02 = 1.03 
or a 3% annual increase in VSL.  As is discussed above, these figures are difficult to 
estimate with precision, but I expect they are almost certainly positive, and a product of 
5% seems well within the range of plausible figures. 
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yields a present value of about $4.4 trillion.127  And because a VSL of 
5.0% would precisely equal the discount rate for the bottom row, the 
final figure on the table displays a present value of $6.30 x 1016, a 
value reflecting an effective discount rate of zero. 
While it is of course impossible to set a price on the salvation of 
the planet and all of its inhabitants, I believe that the further one 
moves to the right on the table, the more reasonable the numbers 
should seem.128  Absent VSL inflation, even fairly low discount rates 
eviscerate the present value of saving the world in 3011.  Including 
VSL inflation eliminates one of the more preposterous results of the 
mechanical application of common CBA techniques, and it brings the 
results of economic calculations closer to those suggested by ethical 
intuition. 
IV 
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
If the theories presented in this Article are correct—that is, (1) 
CBA calculations ignore health inflation and wealth inflation, (2) they 
accordingly fail to inflate the value of future statistical lives before 
discounting them to present value, and (3) as a result, federal agencies 
systematically undervalue human lives predicted to be saved in the 
future by proposed regulations—then so what?  I offer two answers, 
the first immediate and practical, and the second more theoretical. 
A.  Immediate Implications 
Readers persuaded by this Article will recognize that until federal 
agencies reform their CBA processes, Americans will die needlessly, 
largely because regulated entities will be spared the imposition of 
regulations authorized by statute and justified by appropriate 
calculation of costs and benefits.  For the workers who will inhale 
carcinogens if OSHA fails to lower the permissible workplace 
exposure, for the municipal water drinkers who will swallow poison if 
 
127 This figure is in the neighborhood of the entire annual budget of the U.S. 
government.  See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY: 
RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 114 tbl.S-1 (2009) (President’s proposed budget for 
fiscal year 2010). 
128 I recognize that my moral intuition on the proper value cannot be proven accurate.  I 
doubt, however, that many proponents of current CBA practices truly wish to defend the 
valuations at the bottom left of the table. 
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the EPA fails to set a maximum contaminant level,129 for the children 
whose toys the CPSC may or may not regulate, cost-benefit 
calculations are no theoretical matter.  Fortunately, the current 
administration has already indicated a desire to reconsider the CBA 
process, and President Obama has ordered the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) to produce, along with federal regulatory 
agencies, “a set of recommendations for a new Executive Order on 
Federal regulatory review.”130 
A revised executive order could improve CBA calculations across 
the federal government.  Short of a presidential directive that the ideas 
of this Article be adopted, the OMB recommendations could suggest 
that agencies consider incorporating VSL inflation into their CBA 
calculation process, allowing agencies, regulated entities, and activists 
to begin a dialogue in search of the appropriate VSL inflation 
figure.131  In addition, agencies should consider unilateral adoption of 
improved procedures rather than awaiting explicit direction from 
OMB or the President.  Every time an agency seeks comment on a 
proposed regulation whose benefits include saving human lives in the 
future, supporters of the regulation can supplement the agency record 
by submitting comments urging the use of VSL inflation during the 
preparation of the final regulatory impact analysis (RIA).  RIAs 
including these improved procedures could inform the 
administration’s ongoing deliberations. 
The practical effect of considering health inflation and wealth 
inflation during the CBA process—that is, of inflating the value of 
future statistical lives—would be a lower effective discount rate for 
human life.  In other words, whatever discount rate an agency uses to 
discount future costs and benefits to their present value, future human 
lives would be discounted at a lower annual rate.  Using equations, 
the present value of future life equals  
Future VSL / ( 1 + discount rate )years 
 
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 300g–1. 
130 See Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 5977, 5977 (Jan. 30, 2009) (memorandum 
from the President to “Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies” requesting 
“suggestions on the role of cost-benefit analysis”). 
131 Instead of a single figure, agencies might adopt principles to guide future 
calculations, including identification of trustworthy sources of health inflation and wealth 
inflation data and methods of determining to what extent these phenomena overlap, if at 
all. 
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Because the future VSL is equal to 
Present VSL • ( 1 + inflation factor )years 
the present value of a future life equals 
Present VSL • ( 1 + inflation factor )years / ( 1 + discount rate )years 
which equals 
Present VSL • ( ( 1 + inflation factor ) / ( 1 + discount rate ) )years 
An agency can determine the appropriate discount rate for future 
human lives by dividing the VSL inflation factor (based on the 
agency’s predictions of health inflation and wealth inflation) by the 
discount rate used for normal costs and benefits, and then subtracting 
the result from 1.132  If, for example, an agency uses a discount rate of 
5%, and health inflation and wealth inflation justify VSL inflation of 
4% per year, then the effective discount rate for future human lives 
expected to be saved by proposed regulations would be about 1%.133  
With agencies commonly using discount rates of 3% and 7% during 
their CBA processes, even extremely conservative estimates of health 
inflation and wealth inflation would halve the effective discount rate 
for human life.134  By adopting this simple procedural change, 
agencies can immediately cease their pervasive underestimation of the 
benefits of proposed regulations, which would reduce the fatal 
underregulation that kills Americans every year. 
 
132 In other words, the discount rate for human life equals  
1 – ( VSL inflation rate / discount rate ) 
If the VSL inflation rate is the same as the discount rate for normal costs and benefits, the 
discount rate for life would equal zero because  
1 – ( VSL inflation rate / normal discount rate )  
would become  
1 – ( x / x ) 
with x representing the identical rate. 
133 The precise discount rate would be  
1 – ( 1.04 / 1.05 )  
or about 0.95%. 
134 Starting with some of the discount rates proposed by INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. 
ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, supra note 99, conservative estimates of health inflation and 
wealth inflation might bring the effective discount rate for human life to zero.  Note that if 
the VSL inflation rate were higher than the discount rate for normal costs and benefits, this 
formula would yield a negative discount rate for human life, meaning that future lives 
would be valued above present ones.  I recommend that agencies set zero as their 
minimum discount rate rather than using a negative rate. 
TRACHTENBERG 5/4/2011  12:50 PM 
2011] Health Inflation, Wealth Inflation, and the Discounting of Human Life 1351 
B.  Stepping Back 
Persuaded readers might also consider the implications of this 
Article’s premises on CBA more generally.  Although I have 
attempted to rebut the pro-CBA consensus on its own terms, I will not 
insult readers by pretending to have no opinion on the ongoing 
debate.135  A few conclusions follow if the central premises of this 
Article are accepted. 
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis Figures Resemble Wild Guesses 
With federal agencies using discount rates from 0 to 10%, and with 
there being no apparent justification for an agency’s choice of 
discount rates,136 the estimated costs and benefits of a proposed 
regulation can fluctuate wildly based on arbitrary procedural 
calculations.137  If these estimates have undercounted benefits 
because of a widespread failure to account for health inflation and 
wealth inflation, an already capricious process becomes increasingly 
detached from reality.  To be sure, agencies would benefit from 
accurate predictions of costs and benefits of proposed regulations.  
But if the estimated benefits can vary by 25, 50, or 90% because of 
accounting choices,138 then agencies are presented with nearly 
random figures instead of anything accurate.139 
The possibility that a mechanical application of CBA principles 
might yield a negative discount rate for some future costs and 
benefits,140 requiring that agencies value future Americans above 
 
135 See supra notes 37, 42–44 and accompanying text. 
136 See supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION 
& DEV., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A TOOL FOR POLICY COHERENCE 38–39 
(2009) (cataloguing wide divergence in discount rates used across the world, including 
4.5% in the European Community, 7.5 to 12% in Canada, and 6% in Denmark). 
137 For an illustration of the power of small changes to discount rates, see supra Part 
IV.A.  Net benefits will also fluctuate substantially depending on an agency’s choice of 
VSL, another decision about which there is little consensus.  See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. 
CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 136, at 36–37 (noting that primary Canadian and 
American guidance documents suggest VSLs in the range of $1 million to $10 million, 
allowing fluctuation by an order of magnitude). 
138 See Yang Wang, Now, Later, or Never: Applying Asymmetric Discount Rates in 
Nuisance Remedies and Federal Regulations, 105 MICH. L. REV. 2035, 2038 (2007) 
(noting “that even a minute discrepancy in the estimated discount rate can” drastically 
change the desirability of a proposed regulation). 
139 Recall that even before any monetization or discounting of life occurs, CBA already 
involves numerous estimates that build uncertainty into the process.  See supra notes 22–
29 and accompanying text (discussing estimates related to food-labeling regulation). 
140 See supra note 134. 
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those living today (instead of as equals, which critics of discounting 
life advocate, or as less valuable than current Americans, which the 
status quo CBA practice deems them to be) further illustrates the 
questionable assumptions imbedded in current practice.  Debates 
about intergenerational equity and the duty owed by present 
governments to future citizens raise complex questions concerning 
ethics, human behavior, and science.141  When agency heads, 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, delegate to 
number crunchers the question of how Americans today should value 
our expected descendants, they artificially convert policy questions 
into math problems.  It may be sound to discount future Americans at 
some annual rate, or the practice may be unethical.  The answer is not 
available on any spreadsheet.  Converting guesses into numbers 
cloaks uncertainty with the appearance of rigor and provides no real 
answer to the question justifying the exercise of CBA in the first 
place: Is this proposed regulation worth enacting?142 
2.  These Guesses Systematically Harm Americans and Their 
Environment 
As explained more fully above,143 accounting for health inflation 
and wealth inflation would sharply reduce the effective discount rate 
for future human lives, potentially reducing the effective rate to zero.  
Today, however, agencies do not account for health inflation and 
wealth inflation, meaning that across the federal government, every 
single exercise in cost-benefit analysis undervalues the lives of 
 
141 For example, whether the world should respond to climate change soon or instead 
should avoid carbon emission reductions that might slow economic growth, thereby 
having greater resources to tackle the problem later, depends on—among other things—(1) 
how technology is likely to develop, (2) whether certain “tipping points” make adverse 
consequences of climate change irreversible, and (3) whether doctrines like the 
“precautionary principle” mandate prompt action despite uncertainty. 
142 For example, economists can predict the future price of emissions credits under a 
“cap and trade” regime.  See Olivier Durand-Lasserve, Axel Pierru & Yves Smeers, 
Uncertain Long-Run Emissions Targets, CO2 Price and Global Energy Transition: A 
General Equilibrium Approach, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 5108, 5113–18 (2010) (predicting that 
in regions where banking emissions permits is possible, the prices of the permits are 
predicted to follow the “Hotelling rule”); Harold Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible 
Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON. 137, 139–41 (1931) (concluding that, under certain 
conditions, the price of a nonrenewable resource will vary according to the rate of 
interest); see also Shantayanan Devarajan & Anthony C. Fisher, Hotelling’s “Economics 
of Exhaustible Resources”: Fifty Years Later, 19 J. ECON. LITERATURE 65, 66 (1981).  
Economists cannot, however, tell us how much we should care about our grandchildren’s 
quality of life. 
143 See supra text accompanying notes 98–99. 
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Americans whom proposed regulations are designed to protect.  
Where regulations would protect the environment—bringing aesthetic 
benefits along with improvements to human health that accompany a 
cleaner environment—the undervaluation of future human lives 
systematically devalues environmental protection.  Several statutes 
empower (and require) agencies to protect the environment with the 
explicit purpose of safeguarding human health,144 and current CBA 
procedures impede that work every time an agency seeks to fulfill its 
duties by promulgating regulation.  In particular, statutes that invite or 
require a balancing of costs and benefits—for example, by mandating 
safety “to the extent feasible” or by stating that an agency shall 
prevent “unreasonable” risks—are thwarted when agencies employ 
procedures that devalue expected benefits. 
Accordingly, critics who have complained that CBA calculations 
improperly ignore benefits lacking obvious economic value, often 
treating as worthless those benefits officials cannot easily quantify,145 
were more correct than they realized.  Current CBA procedures not 
only ignore a host of important benefits but also devalue the 
remaining benefits assigned a monetary value.  For example, after 
ignoring certain skin cancers altogether when calculating the benefits 
of saving the ozone layer, the EPA then overdiscounted the benefits 
of preventing fatal cancers.146  Incidental benefits—those benefits 
identified in a regulatory impact analysis but left out of the numerical 
table—are provided only to the extent the quantified benefits suffice 
to justify enactment of a regulation.  When the monetized benefits are 
devalued across the board, the inchoate benefits disappear also. 
3.  Systemic Inaccuracy May Violate Legal Mandates 
Executive Order (EO) 12,866, which requires agencies to produce 
CBAs and for the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
 
144 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (Toxic Substances Control Act provision requiring the 
EPA Administrator to regulate chemicals presenting “an unreasonable risk of injury to 
health or the environment”); 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (Occupational Safety and Health Act 
provision requiring the Secretary of Labor to ensure, to the extent feasible, “that no 
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity” because of 
toxic workplace conditions); 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (Clean Air Act provision requiring 
control of emissions that “cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”).  Other relevant statutes include the Safe 
Drinking Water Act and the Clean Water Act. 
145 See supra notes 31–33. 
146 Id. 
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(OIRA) to review them,147 states that “agencies should select those 
approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, 
environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages; 
distributive impacts; and equity), unless a statute requires another 
regulatory approach.”148  If agencies are systematically 
undercounting the benefits of proposed regulation, then they almost 
surely are not promulgating regulations that “maximize net benefits” 
and accordingly are violating EO 12,866.  The OIRA could rectify 
this widespread pattern of violation by “returning” draft regulations to 
agencies with instructions to consider health inflation and wealth 
inflation.  The White House describes OIRA’s review as follows: 
In some cases, when OMB believes that an agency rule is not 
consistent with the principles set forth in Executive Order 12866, 
OIRA “returns” the rule to the agency for further consideration. 
“Returning” a rule means that OIRA has concluded that the draft is 
not consistent with the principles of Executive Order 12866 and that 
further agency effort is needed before the agency may publish the 
rule.  For example, the agency may have provided inadequate 
analysis regarding alternatives.149 
Near universal undercounting of benefits is “not consistent with the 
principles of” EO 12,866, and procedural choices causing systemic 
underprotection of health and the environment by definition yield 
“inadequate analysis regarding alternatives.” 
In addition, even without any executive orders concerning CBA, 
agencies are required by multiple federal statutes to seek accurate 
assessments of the costs and benefits of regulation.150  Certain 
 
147 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601; see also 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB MEMORANDUM 
M-09-13, GUIDANCE FOR REGULATORY REVIEW (2009) (“On January 30, 2009, the 
President issued Executive Order 13497, revoking the previous Administration’s 
amendments to Executive Order 12866, which governs centralized review of significant 
agency actions by [OIRA]. Revocation of these amendments restored the regulatory 
review process to what it had been under Executive Order 12866 between 1993 and 
2007.”). 
148 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1. 
149 See Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) Q&A’s, OFFICE OF MGMT. 
& BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/OIRA_QsandAs/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) 
(describing OIRA review of draft regulations). 
150 The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 604, and the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act both require cost-benefit analysis in certain contexts.  See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(2) 
(requiring “a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits 
of [proposed federal mandates]”); see also supra note 144 (listing provisions requiring 
agencies to act “to the extent feasible” and to eliminate “unreasonable risks,” both 
standards necessitating accurate assessments of costs and benefits). 
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statutes provide for judicial review of whether agencies have 
complied with these procedural requirements.151  Other actions by 
regulatory agencies, such as the issuance of permits and waivers, also 
involve considerations of costs and benefits required by statutes.152  
Here too, pervasive undercounting of benefits prevents agencies from 
obeying statutory mandates. 
CONCLUSION 
The two simple corrections to CBA calculations proposed in this 
Article would immensely increase the monetized benefits of 
regulations expected to save lives in the future.  By accounting for 
health inflation and rising wealth, policy makers can more easily 
justify regulations concerning workplace safety, clean air, clean 
water, and highway safety, to name just a few.  In particular, the long-
term benefits of ameliorating global warming would have 
substantially greater monetary value if properly calculated.  Without 
silencing their ethical and moral critiques of discounting future 
human lives, those opposed to the practice should demand that if 
CBA calculations will incorporate such discounting, they must at least 
begin with a proper assessment of the future value to be discounted, a 
value one can accurately find only with a consideration of health care 
cost inflation and rising per capita wealth. 
 
151 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 611 (allowing judicial review of agency compliance with the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act). 
152 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(m)(1)(B) (allowing the issuance of a permit under the 
Clean Water Act when the costs of strict application of other CWA provisions would 
“exceed by an unreasonable amount the benefits to be obtained”). 
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